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But the patient returns a few weeks later, and
his symptoms are worse. What do you conclude?
You might decide that you gave him the wrong
medicine. Or you might decide that the patient
is even sicker than you thought he was when he
first came in and that you should increase the
dosage.
If you consider the epistemological question,
you realize that either of those conclusions is pos-
sible. The patient could have been sicker than
you realized, and maybe you do have the right
medicine. Or maybe you’re on the wrong track
completely. Because you have only one patient,
you don’t have any way to conduct that controlled
experiment. So, you can’t be sure.
This analogy describes the problem facing the
Obama administration right now. They entered
office when our economy was very sick. They
concluded that, if they did nothing, the unemploy-
ment rate would reach 9 percent. (That was their
forecast in the documents they released shortly
after the election.) But they had a plan to stimulate
the economy by spending a great deal of money,
and with that stimulus—according to their esti-
mates—the unemployment rate would not exceed
8 percent.
At the time of this writing, unemployment is
more than 10 percent. So what do we make of that?
EVALUATING FISCAL POLICY
M
y objective here is to offer some
reflections about recent fiscal policy.
But I want to begin with an example,
and I hope a useful analogy, about medicine.
Imagine you are a physician and a patient
comes to you with some adverse symptoms. He’s
in pretty bad shape. You have never treated a con-
dition quite like this before, and the causes of his
ailments are not at all clear. You remember reading
about a similar case in medical school, and so you
try to recall as much as possible and come up with
a theory as to what is making this patient sick.
Then you choose the medicine that you hope will
make the patient better.
What you would prefer to do is run a con-
trolled experiment. You’d like to assemble 100
patients with similar conditions, give 50 of them
the medicine you think might work and 50 of them
a placebo, and then see whether the patients
receiving the medicine recover. But you do not
have 100 patients; you have only one. What do
you do?
Well, you take your best shot. You decide
what you believe to be the most likely cause of
the patient’s trouble and the most likely remedy
to improve his health. Then you administer the
medicine.
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must be sicker than they thought.
I should emphasize that the Obama adminis-
tration has been guided by a standard theory in
the economics profession—textbook Keynesian
theory, to be specific. They thought that, because
of the credit crisis, people were not able to obtain
loans; and, because people were not able to obtain
loans, there was insufficient aggregate demand.
Looking to the standard textbook theory that fiscal
policy can prop up aggregate demand, they imple-
mented their stimulus plan.
In the forecast the administration used to
describe the effects of the stimulus, they provided
the multipliers that guided their actions. Their
government-purchases multiplier was 1.57, and
their tax multiplier was 0.99. Because 1.57 is larger
than 0.99, they concluded it was better to spend
money than to cut taxes. They obtained those
numbers from a simulation of a standard macro-
econometric model—the kind of model people
have been building for years. It is the kind of
model that Robert Lucas famously critiqued, but
many economists have continued to build such
models and use them for policy analysis and
forecasting.
The question, ultimately, is whether the model
is right, whether it accurately describes how the
world works. If you could be sure the model was
right—if God told you, “Yes, this model of the
economy that you’re simulating, it is truth”—
then, when your stimulus plan was followed by
10 percent unemployment, you would know what
to conclude: The patient was sicker than you
thought, because, after all, the stimulus worked;
my model said so. And if the stimulus worked,
then unemployment would surely have been 11
percent if not for the stimulus. That is the position
the administration is taking now.
Of course, we do not know if it is the right
model. Macroeconomists have to be extremely
humble. There is a lot we do not know.
I teach the Principles of Economics course at
Harvard. It is a full-year course, and I start with
what we economists are confident is true and then
move on to material that is less and less certain
as the year goes on. We look first at supply and
demand, the theory of comparative advantage,
profit maximization, marginal revenue equals
marginal cost—the premises we agree on. Even  -
tually, as the course goes on, we move to macro-
economics. We examine classical monetary
theory, growth theory, and at the very end of the
course the theory of business cycles, which is the
topic we understand least of all.
I am actually a believer in Keynesian theory;
much of my research is in that field. But even as
a believer in many aspects of Keynesian theory, I
appreciate that you cannot approach this subject
matter without showing some humility about what
we, as economists, can truly be confident about.
In an attempt to “know” as much as possi-
ble, the Obama administration is compiling 
data to measure the effect of the stimulus. (See
www.recovery.gov, where you can find state-level
job creation “data” reported to two decimals of
accuracy!) This effort is, I think, the least credible
part of the whole endeavor. The reporting errors
are tremendous because no one accurately fills
out these questionnaires with the true number of
jobs they are creating. 
My favorite story is about a firm that was
selling boots to the U.S. Army; their managers
decided that they were creating one job for every
pair of boots they sold, because, after all, a soldier
could not go to work without a pair of boots. This
anecdote received some attention only because a
reporter looked through the job-creation numbers
and discovered that this particular organization
was the most efficient job creator in the country:
For every $100 spent, they created a job!
Putting aside these absurd reporting errors,
even if the reporting were perfectly correct, the
whole activity still makes no sense. When we talk
about the effects of government purchases on
aggregate demand, and therefore on job creation,
there is an array of general equilibrium effects
(“knock-on effects”) that are tremendously impor-
tant—some positive, some negative. These job-
creation surveys cannot possibly capture these
effects.
The positive effects are those that arise from
the conventional Keynesian fiscal-policy multi-
pliers. Higher government spending leads to
higher income, which causes higher consump-
tion and therefore higher income yet again. But
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multiplier effects involved.
There are also growth-retarding effects asso-
ciated with government spending. If people
observe substantial government debt being issued,
they may anticipate higher future taxes and there-
fore cut back on their current consumption. These
retarding effects are also absent from recovery.gov.
In addition, there are crowding-out effects work-
ing through financial markets. Increased govern-
ment borrowing drives up long-term interest rates
and reduces spending today. But, given its limited
scope, recovery.gov cannot take that into account
either.
So even if the administration could accurately
measure what they set out to measure, the data
they created would not accurately describe, from
a macroeconomist’s standpoint, how many jobs
were created.
TAXING LESS VERSUS SPENDING
MORE
The larger question for me is this: Would we
have been better off focusing on the tax side of
fiscal policy rather than on the government spend-
ing side? I think there are several issues here to
consider.
The first question is whether the government
can spend large sums of money quickly and
wisely. To consider the question, I’ll offer a per-
sonal story. I live in a suburb of Boston called
Wellesley. Coincidentally, my town has been
debating building a new high school, which is
now being constructed just a few blocks from
where I live. The project is creating many jobs and,
in fact, seems to have been planned and imple-
mented in an intelligent and prudent way. Partici  -
pating in such a process makes you realize how
much time it takes to accomplish something this
substantial. The town spent many months debat-
ing whether to build a new high school or renovate
the old high school. Once they decided that issue,
they spent many months designing the new school
and determining everything they wanted in a
school. They spent many more months selecting
the site to build on and which houses to take over
to obtain the land. It was a years-long process.
Now, what if someone had provided all the
funds for a new Wellesley high school but
demanded that it be built immediately? Presum  -
ably, quality would have been sacrificed for speed.
It would have been built more quickly because,
presumably, if people are told they have to spend
money immediately, they will find some way to
do it. But in such an environment—town planning
or national fiscal policy—you wonder whether
money can be spent both quickly and wisely.
The second question, which is more academic
in nature, is about the size of the relevant multi-
pliers. The textbook Keynesian model tells us that
government purchases multipliers are larger than
tax multipliers. And, again, the Obama adminis-
tration’s economic team consulted these standard
models in reaching their conclusions. However,
there is a variety of evidence that calls those con-
clusions into question.
Somewhat ironically, one piece of evidence
against this preference for government spending
over cutting taxes comes from Christina Romer,
the current chair of the Council of Economic
Advisors for President Obama. About six months
before she took that job, she wrote a paper with
her husband David Romer about the impact of tax
policy on the economy (Romer and Romer, 2009).
The Romers wanted to measure the influence of
taxes on gross domestic product (GDP), ensuring
that they identified the exogenous movements in
taxes and separating those from the endogenous
movements, where taxes were responding directly
to the economy.
Their conclusion was that the tax multiplier
was 3—that is, every dollar spent on tax cuts
would raise GDP by $3. That is roughly three times
the size that the Obama administration assumed
with their policy simulations. To be clear, I don’t
blame the Obama administration for relying on
more conventional multiplier estimates. Nor is it
reasonable to assume that simply because they
appointed Christina Romer to chair the Council
that they must use her research in measuring the
multiplier. But the Romers’ research does suggest
that conventional results about tax policy on GDP
are understated.
Of course, it could be the case—and this is in
fact the Obama administration’s interpretation—
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measured. Fiscal policy may be so potent that, if
the tax multiplier is 3, the government’s spending
multiplier might be 4 or 5. The Romers did not
analyze government spending multipliers in their
recent study, but only tax multipliers. Clearly, it
is still an open question. Yet, there has been a
variety of research on government spending multi-
pliers using techniques similar to those used by
the Romers. This research has tried to uncover
exogenous movements in government spending,
and no one finds government spending multipliers
to be especially large.
The best work on this topic, I think, is from
Valerie Ramey at the University of California at
San Diego (Ramey, 2009). Ramey finds government
spending multipliers of about 1.4, which is not
very different from what the Obama administra-
tion assumed, but much smaller than the Romers
found for taxes. Similarly, Andrew Mountford
and Harold Uhlig, using vector autoregression
techniques, have also found that taxes have a
more potent effect than government spending
(Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). 
The piece of evidence I want to draw your
attention to in particular, though, is some very
recent work by my colleagues Alberto Alesina
and Silvia Ardagna at Harvard. They used data
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) to identify every major
fiscal stimulus in those countries (Alesina and
Ardagna, 2009). They then separated out the suc-
cessful policies—those that in fact were followed
by robust economic growth—from the unsuccess-
ful ones and compared their characteristics. They
found that the successful stimulus packages cut
business and income taxes and the unsuccessful
stimulus packages increased government spend-
ing and transfer payments.
The data in the Alesina-Ardagna study are
mostly European, with only a small portion from
the United States. But they lead to conclusions
that are very similar to those from Mountford and
Uhlig’s work using U.S. data in vector autoregres-
sions. These conclusions are also consistent with
the work from Ramey and the Romers that looks
at the historical record to identify multipliers. A
growing body of evidence seems to suggest that
taxes may be a better tool for fiscal stimulus than
conventional models have indicated.
TAXES AS FISCAL POLICY TOOL
What, then, is behind these conclusions that
taxes have a more potent effect on the economy
than spending? The answer is not clear-cut, but
it is easy to speculate why this could be true. Most
obviously, there are effects on the supply side.
Tax rates influence work incentives, for instance.
But even if you believe that aggregate demand
drives the economy in the short run, as many
Keynesians do, you might consider that taxes
affect aggregate demand in ways that are not
included in the textbook Keynesian model.
When we change taxes, we typically do not
just write checks to taxpayers. Usually, we change
marginal tax rates: We change corporate income
taxes, change personal income taxes, and maybe
even institute an investment tax credit. These
measures have more complicated and nuanced
effects on aggregate demand than what the text-
book Keynesian model assumes. It is not simply
a change in cash flow; it is actually a change in
marginal incentives and can even be a direct
encouragement to spend. One example is creating
tax incentives to invest.
The Cash for Clunkers program involved that
type of incentive. I was not much in favor of that
specific micromanagement of how people should
spend their money. Nonetheless, the fact that
people responded to a tax incentive like Cash for
Clunkers does suggest that a more comprehensive
program (such as an investment tax credit) might
have stimulated spending even more broadly.
Many other tax policies have been discussed
recently. One in particular has received some
attention: a tax cut for new hires. As many have
pointed out, the premise behind this policy is that,
because unemployment is so high even as we
proceed through the recovery, we should create
incentives for businesses to hire new workers.
There is a case to be made for a payroll tax
cut. In fact, at one point I advocated an immedi-
ate and permanent payroll tax cut financed by a
gradual increase in gasoline taxes over time. But
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The basic problem is that we do not know how
to properly define—or enforce a definition of—a
“new hire.” Presumably, we do not want a busi-
ness to hire Peter by firing Paul and call Peter a
new hire; that would cause a great deal of ineffi-
cient churning in the labor force.
Usually, when tax credits for new hires are
proposed, the idea is to establish some baseline
employment and give credit to businesses that
meet or exceed that baseline. But even establishing
a baseline has its limitations. Consider an industry
hit particularly hard by a recession—say, construc-
tion—in which employment is well below the
baseline established for the tax breaks. Because a
few new hires would not make these firms eligible
for the tax breaks, these firms would have no mar-
ginal incentive to hire additional workers. Con  -
versely, industries that have been expanding would
be rewarded for hires they may have made even
without the tax incentives. This policy, then, would
likely create tremendous disparities across indus-
tries that could be both inequitable and inefficient.
There is also the problem of new firms. New
firms are always a large part of economic growth
and the overall dynamics of the economy. By
definition, all employees of a new firm are “new
hires.” But if there is a tax credit for new hires at
new firms, then that provides all sorts of incentives
for existing firms to, say, lay off the janitorial staff
and hire instead an independent janitorial con-
tractor that just started up as a new firm. The bot-
tom line is that it is very difficult to implement





Any discussion of fiscal policy has to be
couched in terms of the long-run fiscal picture. I
know that some economists have made the argu-
ment that we should not be concerned about the
long-run fiscal picture when we consider short-
run fiscal policy: Once the economy begins to
grow again, they contend, tax revenue will flow
in and the longer-term fiscal picture will be
improved. That would be true if these policy
multipliers were very large, but they are probably
not so large, in my judgment, that we can ignore the
long-run problems created by short-run policies.
We now face a very dire long-run fiscal picture,
which is being driven by a couple of factors. One
is the aging of the population, with the first wave
of Baby Boomers beginning to retire. I explain
this scenario to my students at Harvard this way:
“My generation has promised ourselves generous
retirement benefits in the form of Social Security
and Medicare, and we promise you’re going to
pay for it. How do you feel about that?”
The bills for those benefits are large partly
because of aging and partly because of higher
healthcare costs. The latter is one of the motiva-
tions, allegedly, for the current healthcare legisla-
tion. I am personally skeptical that this legislation
will reduce healthcare spending substantially—
if at all. So on that score, we are not making true
progress on the long-run fiscal picture. To address
the issue, I would raise the age of eligibility for
Social Security and Medicare. Economists seem
to like this idea, but in polls of the general public
it is much less popular, so I don’t expect this idea
to be implemented. 
I should note that I am not optimistic that any
proposed measure will reduce healthcare costs
significantly. People talk about “bending the
curve” and squeezing out waste, fraud, abuse,
and so on. My reading of the evidence brings me
to the conclusion that healthcare is growing more
expensive over time mainly because technologies
are improving. That is a good thing, but it is also
expensive, and so we must find a way to pay for
it. I am not sure what the right answer is, but I
don’t think that rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse
is going to save much money. I am sure there is
some waste, fraud, and abuse—there is in all
systems—but it is not likely a primary driver of
healthcare costs.
One of the classic hypothetical questions
economists ask when referring to healthcare costs
is, “Would you rather go back to 1950s medical
care and 1950s prices?” If that option were offered
at your place of work, my guess is that you would
not take it. What that means is, in some real sense,
Mankiw
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 2010 181healthcare is cheaper today if you adjust prices
properly to account for quality improvements. A
dollar of healthcare today has more value than a
dollar of healthcare in 1950.
I posed another hypothetical question in a
New York Times column in September 2009:
Imagine a Dorian Gray pill has been invented
and that taking the pill every day will keep you
the same age for as long as you take the pill. It is
perfect healthcare: You would not age or become
sick or die. The problem is that these pills are
expensive—let’s say, it costs $1,000 to manufacture
each daily dose. Again, it is perfect healthcare but
at a very, very expensive price. How would we,
as a society, deal with that? I don’t think we have
the answer to that question, but in some sense we
are moving in that direction already, with health
technology continually improving but also becom-
ing more and more expensive. As a society, we
have not figured out how we are going to eventu-
ally say no to people or have people say no for
themselves.
THE COMING VALUE-ADDED TAX?
I have my own normative conclusions about
addressing some of these problems, such as raising
the retirement age. What I believe is more likely
to occur, however, is that taxes will be raised to
very high levels. I thought it was very interesting
when, in late 2009, Nancy Pelosi suggested the
idea of a value-added tax.
A value-added tax (VAT) is an efficient tax
from an economic standpoint. It is basically a flat
consumption tax, so it tends to be an efficient way
to raise revenue. But it is also a fairly well hidden
tax, and there is some debate among proponents
and opponents about that aspect.
In particular, people look at European coun-
tries and see the connection between their large
governments and their VATs and conclude that
the problem with the VAT is that it makes govern-
ment grow too much. That is one possibility.
Another possibility is that governments grow,
and, when they do so, they look for ways to raise
revenue efficiently. In many cases, they turn to a
VAT. My guess is that the latter is probably the
correct direction of causation and that it is also
probably the direction in which we’re heading:
larger government and higher taxes. If we use the
tax system we have now, though, the revenue
raised will likely fall short; hence, we are proba-
bly going to move in the direction of a VAT.
Such a large change in our tax policy would
inevitably incite comparisons with Europe. There
is a literature about how and why the European
workforce differs from the American workforce—
specifically, why Europeans enjoy spending
more time at the café than Americans do and
why we work harder than they do. There are
many hypothe  ses out there. Olivier Blanchard
says that it stems from cultural tastes (Blanchard,
2004): Europeans have more joie de vivre than
Americans, and therefore they want to enjoy their
high productivity by spending more time enjoy-
ing leisure. My colleagues Alberto Alesina and
Ed Glaeser, as well as Bruce Sacerdote from
Dartmouth (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2005),
say that it is the presence and scope of powerful
labor unions in Europe that have negotiated shorter
workweeks, more vacation days, and so on. But
Ed Prescott tells us it is the high tax rates in Europe
(Prescott, 2004), and I actually find this argument
the most compelling. What that means is, if we
are heading toward higher tax rates, my children
will enjoy a lot more leisure than I do.
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